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GENDER AND RELIGIOUS DRESS AT THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMPARISON OF ŞAHIN V. TURKEY AND ARSLAN
V. TURKEY
Bronwyn Roantree*
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of religious dress in public spaces, long a fraught question
in Europe, has come to the fore with startling force in the past decade. In
2010, the French Parliament approved a law banning any veils that cover the
face (the so-called “burqa ban”) by a vote of 246 in favor and 1 opposed with
100 abstentions. 1 In 2011, Belgium banned the wearing of the full-face veil.2
Bans on veils or other face coverings have been proposed, with varying
degrees of success, in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
Britain, Turkey, Denmark, Russia, Switzerland, and Bulgaria. 3 For Council
of Europe member states—which includes all the countries of Western
Europe, Russia, Turkey, and most former Soviet republics—these national
laws are subject to challenge in the European Court of Human Rights (the
Court). 4 Since 2005, the Court has several times considered whether certain
restrictions on religious dress were consistent with the freedom of religion
protected by Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (the
Convention). 5
* J.D., 2018, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D., 2011, Harvard University; B.A.,
2002, Columbia University.
1. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 d’interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 on Prohibiting Concealment of the Face
in Public Spaces], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18,344.
2. CODE PÉNAL/STRAFWETBOEK [C.PÉN./SW.] art. 563(b) (Belg.). Covering the face in
such a way as to not be identifiable can be punished by a fine of up to €200 or seven days’
imprisonment. The law was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2017. See
Belcacemi et Oussar c. Belgique, App. No. 37798/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175141 [https://perma.cc/N6KQ-58QC].
3. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (May 31, 2018), https://www/bbc.com
/news/world-europe-13038095 [https://perma.cc/BEM9-GS8W].
4. See EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 70–71 (Mark W. Janis,
Richard S. Kay & Anthony W. Bradley eds., 3d ed. 2008).
5. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. The most common restrictions on
religious dress taken up by the Court involve restrictions on the Muslim headscarf. See, e.g.,
Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447; Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
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This paper examines two recent decisions of the European Court
concerning the regulation of religious dress in Turkey: the 2005 case Șahin
v. Turkey, 6 in which the Court upheld a restriction against women wearing a
headscarf while attending lectures at a public university, and the 2010 case
Arslan v. Turkey, 7 in which the Court struck down the convictions of 127
men, members of the Muslim sect Tarikat Aczmendi, for wearing religious
dress while parading en masse in the streets of Ankara. Reading these
decisions together reveals puzzling inconsistencies in the Court’s approach
to restrictions on religious dress in Turkey. The Court is willing to endorse
onerous restrictions on women’s clothing absent evidence that such
restrictions are necessary to protect public order, while it is hesitant to
endorse such restrictions on men’s dress, despite strong evidence that the
men’s dress is an outward display of politically subversive ambition.8
Curiously, the Court characterizes this differential treatment as necessary to
promote gender equality and freedom: a woman’s choice to wear religious
clothing must be interpreted as a symbol of patriarchal domination while a
man’s decision to wear religious clothing may be interpreted as an exercise
of religious freedom. I argue that this assertion masks two troubling
differences in the treatment of male and female applicants: first, the Court
ignores women’s own stated intentions in wearing religious clothing while
accepting those of men; and second, that the Court accepts without question
Turkey’s claim that a woman in religious dress threatens public safety, yet
ignores substantial evidence that male members of a politically subversive
group wearing religious dress do the same. I conclude that the Court’s
account of gender equality is at best confused, and at worst reinforces the
oppression of women.

173; S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341; Belcacemi et Oussar, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).
The Court has also considered restrictions on visible religious jewelry, see Eweida v. United
Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215, 218–19 (finding that restrictions on wearing visible
Christian crosses at work constituted a violation of Article 9 for one applicant who worked
behind the counter for British Airways, but not for a second applicant who worked as a nurse),
and requirements that persons be bareheaded in identity photographs, see Singh v. France,
App. No.24479/0, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (finding that a requirement that persons appear
bareheaded in identity photographs for use on driving licenses did not impermissibly infringe
on the rights of a Sikh man).
6. See Șahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
7. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22\%22AFFAIRE%20AHMET%20AR
SLAN%20c.%20TURQUIE\%22%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHA
MBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-94065%22]}
[https://perma.cc/DZA9-DQVE]. All translations from the original French are my own.
8. In a recent decision involving Belgium, the Court adopted a slightly more nuanced
approach, upholding for the first time the right of a Muslim woman to wear a headscarf in a
public forum. Lachiri v. Belgium, App. No. 3413/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Lachiri%22],%22documentcollectioni
d2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001186245%22]} [https://perma.cc/QA9A-CMTF]. The decision is carefully circumscribed,
however, notably declining to consider whether the ban could have been upheld on the grounds
of maintaining the neutrality of the public arena. Id. § 46.
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The Essay proceeds as follows: Section I discusses the Court and its
protection of religious freedom. Section II briefly characterizes the Turkish
understanding of laïk, focusing on how this understanding influences the
state’s approach to restrictions on religious dress. Section III takes up the
two cases under discussion, Șahin and Arslan, paying particular attention to
the Court’s analysis of both the applicants’ intent and the state’s evidence—
or lack thereof—that the clothing in question threatened public order.
Finally, Section IV concludes that the different treatment the Court extends
to men and women in cases involving restrictions on religious dress reveals
serious deficiencies in the Court’s understanding of the value of gender
equality.
I. ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Established in 1950 by the European Convention on Human Rights, the
European Court of Human Rights is a supra-national court that provides legal
recourse of last resort. 9 Article 9 protects freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion:
9(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance. 10

This protection, however, is subject to certain limitations:
9(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. 11

As a manifestation of religion, religious dress may be subject to limitation,
provided that three conditions are met: (1) the limitation must be prescribed
by law; (2) it must pursue a legitimate aim; and (3) it must be necessary in a
democratic society. 12 Taking each condition in turn, the first, prescribed by
law, guards against arbitrary limitations on the manifestation of religion,
requiring that any such laws be accessible and foreseeable in its effects.13
Second, a law restricting manifestations of thought, conscience, or belief
must have a legitimate aim, which, under Article 9(2), means that the
restriction must be adopted in the interest of public safety, the protection of
public health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 4, at 74–75.
Convention, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
See JEAN-FRANÇOIS RENUCCI, ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION 45 (2005) (“The law must
therefore be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate his
conduct—if need be with appropriate advice.”).
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others. 14 Finally, the limitation must be necessary in a democratic society.
The Court has fleshed out this last rather vague requirement, identifying
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness as traits necessary in a democratic
society. 15
In both Şahin 16 and Arslan, 17 Turkey argued that the limitations are
prescribed by law, were adopted in the interest of protecting public safety
and public order, and are necessary in a democratic society. Before turning
to the Court’s decisions in the two cases, however, it is first necessary to
briefly describe the principle of laïk in Turkey.
II. LAÏK
Though laïk is translated as secularism in English, it is a distinct concept.
Before elaborating what laïk is, it is important to establish what it is not: laïk
is not analogous to the notion of secularism that developed in the nineteenth
century in the United Kingdom and Germany. There, “secularism” had
relatively modest goals, seeking not to exclude religious actors or religious
arguments from politics entirely, but rather only to eliminate the most
egregious form of religious interference in politics. 18 By contrast, the
Turkish notion of laïk is much closer to the French concept of laïcité. As
elaborated in the French 1905 Law of Separation, 19 laïcité draws a sharp, bidirectional distinction between religion and the state, implying that the
radical separation of religion from politics was not only possible, but also

14. See Convention, supra note 5.
15. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 34 (1976),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22handyside%22],%22documentcollecti
onid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%2200157499%22]} [https://perma.cc/P8HC-37LY]; see also RENUCCI, supra note 13, at 47.
Democratic necessity is a complex principle that includes three criteria: “the need for the
measure taken, the connection and proportionality between the measure and the legitimate aim
cited and, lastly, the measure’s consistency with the democratic spirit.” Id.
16. See infra notes and 30–42 accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text.
18. The word secularism, as opposed to secularization, was introduced into the English
language in the Victorian period by the British free-thinker and political activist George
Holyoake. Excluded from political office because of the religious tests for office that were
common at the time, the secularists were preoccupied with politics and saw their movement
as much a political, as an intellectual, agitation. See EDWARD ROYLE, VICTORIAN INFIDELS:
THE ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH SECULARIST MOVEMENT, 1791–1866, at 4 (1974). Several
decades after Holyoake’s movement took hold, reformers in Weimar Germany abolished
religious tests for office. See generally PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
CRISIS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF WEIMAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).
19. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat [Law of 9
December 1905 concerning the Separation of Church and State], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 12, 1905.
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desirable. 20 Like laïcité, laïk envisions a regime in which “religion is
shielded from a political role.” 21
Indeed, since its founding in 1923, the Turkish Republic has understood
laïk to be intimately intertwined with democracy. 22 In 1937, laïk was
formalized as one of three constitutional principles, the other two being social
equality and equality before the law. 23 These three principles are seen as
foundational and mutually reinforcing: a threat to any of the three is a threat
to democracy. Per the Constitutional Court, laïk is a principle that protects
the individual and his or her identity as an individual: “[Laïk] is the principle
which offers the individual the possibility to affirm his or her own personality
through freedom of thought.” 24 By protecting freedom of thought, laïk
promotes religious freedom. 25 Further, because laïk makes possible an
individual identity apart from religious affiliation, manifestations of
religion—which inevitably signal membership in a religious group—may
conflict with laïk. Freed from the tyranny of a religious hegemon that
requires visible markers of religious affiliation, individuals can freely
choose—or decline—to practice their religion.
Laïk has thus been understood as requiring regulations on religious dress
since the early days of the Turkish Republic, with the Dress (Regulations)
Act of 3 December 1934 prohibiting imams from wearing religious clothing
in the streets. 26 Religious dress was seen not as an individual choice, but
rather as an imposition mandated by a religion “perceived and presented as a
set of values that were incompatible with those of contemporary society.” 27
The Islamic headscarf has proven particularly controversial, with the
Supreme Administrative Court writing that “[b]eyond being a mere innocent
practice, wearing the headscarf is in the process of becoming the symbol of
20. See generally David Saunders, France on the Knife-Edge of Religion:
Commemorating the Centenary of the Law of 9 December 1905 on the Separation of Church
and State, in SECULARISM, RELIGION AND MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 56 (Geoffrey Brahm
Levey & Tariq Modood, eds., 2009).
21. See Judgment of 7 March 1989, E: 1989/1, K: 1989/12, Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
22. Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution provides that:
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by rule
of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting
human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental
tenets set forth in the preamble.
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982 art. 2 (Turk.).
23. See Mustafa Erdodan, Religious Freedom in the Turkish Constitution, 89 MUSLIM
WORLD 377, 378 (1999).
24. Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 187 (quoting the Turkey Constitutional
Court’s judgment of 7 March 1989).
25. See id. (noting that “the distinction [laïk] makes between politics and religious belief,
renders freedom of conscience and religion effective” (quoting the Turkey Constitutional
Court’s judgment of 7 March 1989)).
26. T. Jeremy Gunn, Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of
Human Rights in Şahin v. Turkey, 3 DROITS ET RELIGIONS, 339, 345 n.18 (2008). Dr. Gunn
notes that Atatürk imposed restrictions on secular as well as religious dress in an effort to
modernize and westernize Turkey, famously outlawing the fez in 1925. See id.
27. Șahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 187.
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a vision that is contrary to the freedoms of women and the fundamental
principles of the Republic.” 28 With this brief account of laïk in place, I turn
now to two recent cases in which the European Court considered Turkish
restrictions on religious dress, Șahin and Arslan.
III. ȘAHIN V. TURKEY & ARSLAN V. TURKEY
The perceived relationship between religious dress and anti-democratic
principles is at the heart of Turkey’s argument in both Șahin and Arslan.
Turkey contends that the headscarf at issue in Șahin and the traditional dress
at issue in Arslan communicate the wearers’ support for politically
subversive and anti-democratic Islamic groups, and as such, the state has the
right and the obligation to prohibit persons from publicly appearing in the
garments. 29
A. Șahin v. Turkey
Șahin v. Turkey centers on Leyla Șahin, then a 24-year-old student in the
Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul University, who was refused access to
lectures and exams because she was wearing an Islamic headscarf. In
accordance with a judgment of the Turkish Constitutional Court, the
University had banned women from wearing the headscarf on university
premises. 30 Șahin asserted that this policy constituted an interference with
her right under Article 9(2) to manifest her religion, while the state countered
that the restriction was necessary to protect public safety and order. The
headscarf, the state claimed, had become a symbol of subversive political
Islamic movements that sought to undermine the Republic and thereby
threatened democracy itself. 31 Regardless of whether the applicant herself
meant to communicate support for such groups, by wearing the headscarf,
the Court contended that she signaled such support to the university
community. Indeed, the applicant maintained that she wore the headscarf
purely from religious conviction, because she was raised “in a traditional
family of practicing Muslims and considers it her religious duty to wear the
Islamic headscarf.” 32 Șahin contended that she had never sought to influence
the beliefs of her fellow students by wearing the headscarf. 33 The state
provided no evidence to the contrary. 34 In a 16 to 1 decision, the Court found

28. Id. (quoting the Supreme Administrative Court of Turkey).
29. See Șahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 187; Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur.
Ct. H.R. § 27 (2009), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22\%22AFFAIRE
%20AHMET%20ARSLAN%20c.%20TURQUIE\%22%22],%22documentcollectionid2%2
2:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%2200194065%22]} [https://perma.cc/DZA9-DQVE].
30. See Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 187–88 (“[S]tudents had to be permitted to work
and pursue their education together in a calm, tolerant and mutually supportive atmosphere
without being deflected from that goal by signs of religious affiliation.”).
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 181.
33. See id. at 201.
34. See id. at 201–02.
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in favor of the state, in effect endorsing Turkey’s argument that the intentions
of the wearer are not decisive. 35 The headscarf, the Court determined, was a
political symbol whose meaning and significance were determined not by the
women who wear it, but by the state.
The Court’s decision was not, however, unanimous. In a careful dissent,
Judge Françoise Tulkens observed that secularism is “an essential
principle . . . undoubtedly necessary for the protection of the democratic
system in Turkey.” 36 Yet, said Tulkens, while the Court is fiercely
protective—indeed perhaps overprotective—of an individual’s right to hold
certain beliefs, it is less willing to intervene to protect manifestations of
religion. 37 The Court’s refusal to consider Șahin’s explicit intention in
wearing the headscarf is deeply problematic: the Court ignored not only
Șahin’s statements that she had “no intention of calling the principle of
secularism, a principle with which she agreed, into question,” but also the
lack of any evidence to show that she “through her attitude, conduct or acts,
contravened [the] principle [of secularism].” 38 Turkey did not argue that the
headscarf was “ostentatious or aggressive or was used to exert pressure, to
provoke a reaction, to proselytize or to spread propaganda and undermined—
or was liable to undermine—the convictions of others.” 39 Further, there was
no evidence that Șahin’s wearing of the scarf disrupted the life of the
university in any way. 40 Most troublingly, while Turkey argued that
fundamentalist religious groups pressured women to wear the headscarf, both
Turkey and the Court’s majority failed to consider that the woman at the
center of the case was an adult and a university student who “might
reasonably be expected to have a heightened capacity to resist [such]
pressure.” 41 It is difficult to see, then, how the Court’s decision amounts to
anything other than paternalism in violation of the principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and the right to personal autonomy strictly upheld by the
Court in other settings. 42 The Court’s decision is problematic not only
because it represents a misapplication of the limitations clause in Article 9(2),
but also because it does so at the expense of the values of gender equality to
which the Court is otherwise so deeply committed. A case that came before
the court five years later, also involving Turkey’s efforts to prohibit religious
dress, but this time the dress of men, affirms that Judge Tulkens’s concerns
about gender equality were well-placed. It is to that case that we now turn.
B. Arslan v. Turkey
The applicants in Arslan were 127 members of a small Muslim sect,
Tarikat Aczmendi, who had gathered together from across the country in
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 208.
See id. at 222 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 222–23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 223–24.
See id.
Id. at 224–25.
See id. at 225.
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Ankara, on October 20, 1996, for a religious ceremony at a local mosque.43
The sect teaches that it is a religious duty to wear particular clothing, namely
a turban, baggy trousers and black tunic, and to carry a stick. 44 Before the
ceremony, the group walked en masse through the streets of Ankara wearing
this distinctive dress. 45 The men were arrested by local police and charged
with violating two laws regulating the wearing of religious dress. 46
The applicants wore the same distinctive dress to the preliminary hearing
on January 8, 1997, despite a warning from the trial judge that the clothing
would be interpreted as a sign of disrespect for the court. 47 At trial, the
applicants were found guilty and were sentenced to two months in prison,
commuted to a fine of $4. 48 At the appeal before the Court, Turkey argued
that their insistence on wearing their religious dress in the courtroom, even
after being instructed that such behavior would be considered hostile to the
state, was “characteristic of their sect, which envisioned the installation of a
system of laws based on sharia as a replacement of the democratic regime
and was guided not by their convictions but in order to defy justice.” 49
Regardless of the applicants’ intent, wearing distinctive clothing while in
a large group and in a public space, Turkey argued, amounted to provocation,
proselytism, and propaganda. 50 The limitations on the men’s religious dress
was “intended to uphold secular democratic principles” and protect public
order and safety. 51 The applicants asserted that they did not intend to
communicate a political message through their dress, declaring that their
clothing was “dictated by their faith and had no political significance.” 52
While the Court had upheld a similar restriction in Șahin, here the Court
found in favor of the applicants. In a majority decision penned by the same
Judge Tulkens, the Court accepted the applicants’ assertion that they
intended their clothing to have only religious and not political significance:
“[T]he Court finds nothing in the record to show that the applicants had tried
to inflict undue pressure on passersby with the intent of promoting their
beliefs.” 53 Crucially, the Court emphasized the importance of the applicants’
stated intention in wearing the clothing: they claimed to have no political
motivations and so the state ought not ascribe such motivations to them. If a
43. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 1, 6–7 (2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22\%22AFFAIRE%20AHMET%20AR
SLAN%20c.%20TURQUIE\%22%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHA
MBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-94065%22]}
[https://perma.cc/DZA9-DQVE].
44. Id. § 7.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 10. The laws in question are Act 671, the so-called “hat law” adopted on
November 25, 1925, and Act 2596, which prohibited the wearing of certain religious garments
in public spaces.
47. See id. § 11.
48. See id. § 14.
49. Id. § 27.
50. See id. § 29.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 15.
53. Id. § 50.
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bystander incorrectly attributes a subversive political intention to a member
of the group because of the clothes he is wearing, the group member cannot
be held accountable for this error.
The Court is thus careful here to distinguish the individual members from
the group and refrain from attributing to any individual group member the
ideology of the group writ large. That the group holds views antithetical to
the democratic and secular state, is, however, undeniable. Speaking to the
major daily newspaper Milliyet in 1996, the leader of Tarikat Aczmendi
asserted that:
even if the regime today does not want to go, it will have to go. If the
leaders themselves do not choose Shariat, the people will bring it. And
God forbid, there will be a lot of bloodshed then. . . . If we are forced to,
we do not listen to any rules and regulations. 54

That the Court might be unaware of the subversive political intentions of the
group is impossible, given that the same leader appeared as an applicant
before the Court in a case decided in 2004, Gündüz v. Turkey. 55 Gündüz
appealed to the Court concerning his 1996 conviction on charges of
“incit[ing] the people to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction
founded on religion” as a result of his appearance on a television program in
which he argued that democracy was incompatible with Islam. 56 Among the
documents in that case are transcripts of his statements made on the program,
including: “Kemalism was born recently. It is a religion—that is, it is the
name of a religion that has destroyed Islam and taken its place. Kemalism is
a religion and secularism has no religion. Being a democrat also means
having no religion.” 57 This statement and others are a direct indictment of
secularism and democracy. Yet the Court found that Turkey’s conviction of
Gündüz violated his right to free expression and ordered the state to pay the
applicant €5000 in damages. 58 Though Tarikat Aczmendi is precisely the
kind of politically subversive Islamist movement that the state invoked in
Șahin, the Court found in favor of the group on two separate occasions.
Reading the Court’s decisions in Șahin and Arslan together raises serious
questions: can these decisions be reconciled with one another and, if not,
what does this tell us about the Court’s approach to limitations on religious
dress?

54. Aylen Güney, The Military, Politics, and Post-Cold War Dilemmas in Turkey, in
POLITICAL ARMIES: THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 162,
176 n.21 (Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt, eds., 2002) (quoting an interview with the leader of
the Tarikat Aczmendi in a newspaper).
55. Gündüz v. Turkey, App. No. 35071/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), https://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22G%C3%BCnd%C3%BCz%22],%22documentcollectionid2
%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%2200161522%22]} [https://perma.cc/TH9L-JS72].
56. Id. § 13.
57. Id. § 11.
58. Id. § 57.
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CONCLUSION
The Court reached opposite conclusions in Șahin and Arslan, finding no
violation of Article 9 in the first and a violation of Article 9 in the second.
Turkey’s justification for the limitation is the same in both cases: the need to
protect public order and safety. While a majority of the Court accepted
Turkey’s argument in Șahin that a lone woman wearing a headscarf while
attending lectures at a public university constituted a threat to public safety,
even though the applicant denied any ties to radical groups or to holding any
anti-secularist or anti-democratic beliefs, that same Court found that the right
of men to march en masse in the distinctive dress of a politically subversive
religious movement outweighed any public safety concerns. In Arslan, the
Court distinguished Șahin by asserting that the former involved public spaces
whereas the latter did not. I argue that this distinction is fallacious, and that
the different outcomes are more likely attributable to the different standards
by which the Court evaluates women’s religiously significant dress.
First, the Court distinguished between the public spaces in which the
religiously significant dress was worn in Șahin and Arslan: public
educational institutions in the former, 59 and the public square in the latter.60
The distinction is meaningful presumably because the state has a greater
interest in enforcing its values in public schools than in public spaces more
broadly. 61 Indeed, in its discussion of whether the prohibition on
headscarves violated Șahin’s right to education under Article 2, Protocol 1 of
the Convention, 62 the Court notes that the right to education can be restricted
only where the restrictions are foreseeable, pursue a legitimate aim, and are
proportional with the aim to be achieved. 63 The Court concluded that each
of these requirements was met: preserving the secular character of
educational institutions is a legitimate aim, the restriction was foreseeable,64
59. See Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
60. See Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 49 (2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22\%22AFFAIRE%20AHMET%20AR
SLAN%20c.%20TURQUIE\%22%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHA
MBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-94065%22]}
[https://perma.cc/DZA9-DQVE].
61. In accordance with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, individual states are
granted significant latitude in their regulation of schools, “although the final decision as to the
observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court.” Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 214–15.
62. Convention, supra note 5. “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State
shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions.” Id.
63. See Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 214–15.
64. The Court notes that it was “unrealistic” that Șahin would not have known of the
restriction before matriculation, and so presumably should have decided to pursue her medical
education elsewhere. Id. at 216. After losing the case, Şahin did indeed go elsewhere to pursue
her medical education, finishing her education at the Faculty of Medicine at Vienna University
in Austria. Id. at 214–15. Şahin has since become a member of parliament in the AKP. See
Leyla Şahin Usta, AK PARTI, http://www.akparti.org.tr/en/ak-kadro/central-decisionmaking-and-administrative-committee/leyla-sahin-usta [https://perma.cc/34RC-SUY4] (last
visited Mar. 6, 2019).
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and the measure was proportionate because banning the headscarf does not
interfere with students’ ability to perform religious duties and the university
took certain measures to “avoid having to turn away students wearing the
headscarf.” 65 The Court has upheld state restrictions on religious expression
in public primary schools, finding that young students are impressionable and
uniquely vulnerable to manipulation. 66 While such restrictions may be
persuasive vis-à-vis primary schools, the argument is less convincing when
the students at issue are university students pursuing medical degrees. Even
if a certain degree of paternalism towards university students is accepted,
doing so at the expense of a student’s fundamental right is troubling.
Second, the Court’s treatment of gender in the two cases raises significant
questions. The state imposes—and the Court accepts—more stringent
restrictions on women’s dress, despite its failure to present any “tangible
argument or evidence that the headscarves posed a threat to public order, to
women’s rights, or to the religious freedom and expression of others.” 67 The
Court declared in Șahin that limitations on the headscarf may be justified in
order to promote gender equality because the headscarf was a “‘powerful
external symbol’ . . . imposed on women by a religious precept” and, as such,
was “hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality.” 68 The Court
declined, however, to elaborate what the principle of gender equality entails.
As Judge Tulkens observed: “Wearing the headscarf is considered . . .
synonymous with the alienation of women. The ban on wearing the
headscarf is therefore seen as promoting equality between men and women.
However, what, in fact, is the connection between the ban and sexual
equality? The judgment does not say.” 69 The lack of analysis is particularly
surprising given the presence of a countervailing right guaranteed by the
Convention. As Cindy Skach observes, the Grand Chamber’s analysis of
gender equality in Şahin is “notably thin and unsatisfying.” 70 Its “conclusory
reasoning is simply inadequate to address the fundamental questions here.”71
Simply declaring that prohibitions on the headscarf promote gender equality
should not be sufficient for limiting women’s freedom of religion. Indeed,
as Arslan demonstrates, far from promoting gender equality, by upholding
the prohibition on the headscarf the Court is re-entrenching gender
discrimination with its willingness to accept men’s self-ascriptions of their
intentions, even when there is significant evidence contradicting their claims,
yet rejecting the same self-ascriptions from women. By rejecting women’s
65. See Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 216. The Court asserted this rather controversial
claim with no discussion.
66. See, e.g., Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (noting that a teacher
wearing a headscarf may impact the freedom of conscience and religion of children ages four
to eight).
67. Cindy Skach, Religious Freedom—State Neutrality—Public Order—Role of
International Standards in Interpreting and Implementing Constitutionally Guaranteed
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 186, 192 (2006).
68. See Şahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 205.
69. Id. at 225 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
70. Skach, supra note 67, at 192.
71. Id. at 193.

112

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 87

own statements of their intentions, the Court is effectively erasing women’s
agency, an erasure made even more problematic because it is done in the
name of gender equality.
Further, the Court assumed that the headscarf admits of only one political
interpretation: namely, support for anti-secularist, revolutionary Islamism.
This univocal interpretation of the headscarf has been challenged, noting that
the headscarf has become, for many women, a symbol of dissent against
colonial or authoritarian regimes that outlawed the headscarf.72 Insisting that
the religious significance of women’s dress cannot be distinguished from its
political significance and that such dress admits of only one interpretation,
regardless of how the women wearing the clothing actually interpret their
own dress, is to place an onerous burden on women seeking to wear
religiously significant clothing. That this same burden is not also imposed
on men’s religious dress, which, to the contrary, are permitted to have
multiple and nuanced meanings that are deciphered not by the state or by the
Court but by the man wearing the clothes, is striking. Indeed, it is difficult
to square this differential treatment with the promotion of gender equality to
which the Court is apparently committed.
At the same time that the Court refuses to accept women’s stated intentions
for wearing religiously-significant clothing, it ascribes tremendous power to
women in such clothing. According to the Court, a single woman in a
headscarf during a medical school exam exerts more undue pressure on
observers than does a group of more than 100 identically-dressed men, easily
identifiable as members of a politically subversive group hostile to the state
and to secularism, marching through the streets with sticks. Endowing
women with such power, and then using that purported power as a basis for
curtailing women’s agency, is a familiar trope. As more and more states
impose or contemplate restrictions on women’s religious dress, the
relationship between women’s agency, gender equality, and religious dress
will likely come before the Court again, and a more sustained treatment of
these complex issues by the Court will be in order.

72. See Nicholas Gibson, An Unwelcome Trend: Religious Dress and Human Rights
Following Leyla Şahin vs Turkey, 25 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS 599, 624 (2007). Gibson observes
that “it is farcical to suggest that wearing the Islamic headscarf is comparable with advocating
violent political upheaval.” Id. at 530; see also JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE
HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 186–87 (2007).

